

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 042249

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 042249

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE, VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 042249 ACTION NATO INFO USCINCEUR
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QTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 042249

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OREP, MCAP, NATO
SUBJECT: HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE

REF: A) STATE 33235, B) USNATO 1138 (NOTAL)

1. ALTHOUGH COMMITTEE MEMBERS ASKED ABOUT A VARIETY
OF SUBJECTS, THE MAJORITY OF QUESTIONS DEALT WITH BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS (US-FRG OFFSET AND JACKSON-NUNN) AND MBFR.
THE FOLLOWING IS A CONSOLIDATION BY SUBJECT AND SUMMARY
OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT HARTMAN'S FEBRUARY 15
HEARING IN ORDER OF DECLINING IMPORTANCE, AS INDICATED
BY THE FREQUENCY AND SCOPE OF QUESTIONS:

(A) BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

(L) QUESTIONS ON BURDENSARING WERE AIMED AT
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PAGE 02 STATE 042249

DETERMINING WHETHER JACKSON-NUNN SHOULD BE RETAINED. THIS

LINE OF QUESTIONING WAS APPARENTLY LINKED TO STATEMENT
BY HOUSE CONFEREES IN OCTOBER 13 CONFERENCE REPORT THAT

UPON COMPLETION OF RANDALL COMMITTEE STUDY, "THE HOUSE
WILL BE IN A POSITION TO REANALYZE THE NECESSITY FOR
THIS PROVISION" (I.E., JACKSON-NUNN). FOLLOWING IS GIST
OF Q'S AND A'S.

Q: YOU ARE SAYING THAT IN LIGHT OF MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS, NOW IS NO TIME FOR A UNILATERAL REDUCTION,
THAT IT IS THE VERY WORST TIME THERE COULD BE?

A: THAT IS CORRECT.

Q: HOW WAS THE STUDY OF BOP RECEIVED AT DECEMBER
MEETING OF NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS?

A: PARA 10 OF 12-73 DPC COMMUNIQUE WAS READ INTO THE
RECORD BY ASST. SEC. HARTMAN.

. Q: ON PAGE 10 OF YOUR STATEMENT IS AS FORTHRIGHT,
LOGICAL, AND VALID AN ANSWER AS THERE IS TO THE QUESTION
"WHY SHOULDN'T WE BEGIN TO WITHDRAW AFTER 30 YEARS.
YOU HAVE MADE A CONTRIBUTION WHEN YOU TELL US THAT WE
ARE DEALING WITH A WESTERN EUROPE THAT IS NOT NOW AND
NEVER HAS BEEN A SINGLE ENTITY. THE COLLECTIVE FRAMEWORK
IS HELD TOGETHER BY THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT, AND IT IS
QUITE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE ALLIES WOULD
SEPARATELY INCREASE THEIR FORCES COMMENSURATE WITH US
WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT MEANS THAT THE ALLIANCE SIMPLY IS
DOWNGRADED.

A: CENTRAL POINT IS THAT US FORCES ARE NOT IN
EUROPE TO PROTECT EUROPEAN SECURITY BUT TO PROTECT
AMERICAN SECURITY. THEY MAKE POSSIBLE AN ADDITIONAL
CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY OF BOTH EUROPE AND THE US,
BECAUSE THEY MAKE POSSIBLE A GREATER EFFORT ON THE PART
OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. IT IS A MISTAKE TO FEEL THIS
IS SOMETHING WE ARE DOING IN EUROPEAN INTEREST, EITHER
BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT UNIFIED OR INCAPABLE OF DEFENDING
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PAGE 03 STATE 042249

THEMSELVES. THESE FORCES ARE THERE IN THE US SECURITY
INTEREST.

Q: HOW ARE WE DOING WITH REGARD TO JACKSON-NUNN?
HOW DO WE STAND WITH REGARD TO THE BOP DEFICIT AS OF NOW?

A: IT IS REALLY TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER WE HAVE
OFFSET THE DEFICIT. THAT IS THE PURPOSE OF OUR

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GERMANS AND OUR OTHER NATO ALLIES.
"OUR ALLIES ARE WELL AWARE THAT IT IS PART OF OUR LAW,

THAT IT CAN HAVE CONSEQUENCES, AND AS I INDICATED IN
READING THE PARAGRAPH FROM THE DEFENSE MINISTERS
COMMUNIQUE, THEY ARE GOING TO MAKE THEIR BEST EFFORTS
TO MEET US ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE JACKSON-NUNN
AMENDMENT."

Q: HAVE YOU READ THE SENATE STUDY PREPARED BY MESSRS.
LOWENSTEIN AND MOOSE ? THEY SAY IN EFFECT, "THERE
JUST AIN'T NO WAY OF BALANCING THIS DEFICIT," AND THE
ALLIES ARE NOT ABOUT TO DO A GREAT DEAL MORE THAN WHAT
THEY HAVE DONE. DOES THE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANY REFUTATION
TO THAT?

A: WE ARE GOING TO BE ABLE TO COME CLOSE. THERE MAY
BE SOME ARGUMENT OVER DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES
"HARD" OR "SOFT" OFFSET, WHAT SOME OF THE COMPONENTS
OF THIS MIGHT BE. I WAS PERHAPS MORE OPTIMISTIC
BEFORE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION BEGAN TO TURN AROUND, AND
PARTICULARLY IF THESE NEW OIL PRICES BEGIN TO CAUSE
GREAT BOP DIFFICULTIES IN EUROPE, WE MAY RUN INTO MORE
RELUCTANCE TO DO CERTAIN THINGS THAN PEOPLE MIGHT HAVE
BEEN PREPARED TO DO EARLIER. BUT AT THE MOMENT, OUR
JUDGMENT IS THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE OF MEETING THIS
REQUIREMENT. WE ARE PURSUING THAT. I THINK WE CAN
MAKE A REPORT TO YOU WHEN WE HAVE HAD A BETTER RESPONSE
FROM, PARTICULARLY, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, BECAUSE THAT
IS BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS

Q: WOULDN'T THE EUROPEANS RATHER USE THEIR LIMITED
RESOURCES TO BUILD UP THE COMMON DEFENSE? WHY SHOULD THEY
SPEND IT TO PAY OFF UNCLE SAM, IF THAT MEANS THEY ARE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 042249

GOING TO HAVE LESS MONEY TO CONTRIBUTE TO EDIP?

A: ASST. SECRETARY AGREED THAT THIS WAS TRUE BUT POINTED OUT
THAT PART OF THE FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM IS RE-EQUIP-
MENT, AND SEVERAL OF OUR ALLIES HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY
INTEND TO BUY US EQUIPMENT. THIS WILL CERTAINLY
CONTRIBUTE TO BOP OFFSET.

Q: SECRETARY SCHLESINGER TOLD US THAT THE ALLIES WERE
MAKING A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY BUILDING UP THEIR
OWN DEFENSES, AND THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF WE
WERE, IN A SENSE, TO REPUDIATE THAT EFFORT BY INSISTING
ON SOME PARTICULAR MONETARY FIGURE AS THE TEST AS TO
WHETHER WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE OUR COMMITMENT OR NOT.

A: I AGREE, WE OUGHT TO THINK LONG AND HARD ABOUT AN ARBITRARY TEST WHICH MIGHT GO AGAINST US SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT WE RECOGNIZE IT WAS THE WILL OF CONGRESS.

Q: THAT IS EXACTLY THE QUESTION I AM TRYING TO RAISE: WHETHER THIS COMMITTEE, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO APPRAISE THIS SITUATION AND REPORT TO CONGRESS BY APRIL 1, OUGHT TO QUERY WHETHER THE JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT WAS A WISE DECISION.

A: "IN SPEAKING FOR THE DEPARTMENT, I CAN CERTAINLY SAY WE WOULD ENCOURAGE SUCH AN APPRAISAL. AT THE SAME TIME, I WANT TO ASSURE THE CONGRESS THAT WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT WHICH IS PRESENTLY IN THE LAW."

Q: THERE HAVE BEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT OFFSET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND WEST GERMANY HAVE BEEN AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ABOUT NOVEMBER. CAN YOU TELL US IF THIS IS SO AND, IF SO, WHY? WHAT ARE WE REQUESTING AND WHAT ARE THE GERMAN COUNTER-PROPOSALS?

A: THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT STALLED. I WOULD PREFER NOT TO GET INTO DETAILS , BECAUSE WE ARE DISCUSSING THESE THINGS. PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN MADE, AND STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO US THAT THESE WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 042249

CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY, AND WE HOPE VERY SOON
TO HAVE A
CONCLUSION TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS

Q: CAN YOU ASSESS THE EFFECT, IF ANY, ON OUR NATO ALLIES, OF THE ADOPTION OF THE AMENDMENT TO PL93-155, WHICH DIRECTS THAT WE INDEPENDENTLY REVIEW THE QUESTION OF US TROOP COMMITMENTS IN EUROPE, AND OF THE JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT ITSELF?

A: THE MOST OUTSTANDING EFFECT IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF SOME OF THE CONCERNS THAT WE HAVE EXPRESSED. I THINK THE ALLIES ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE STATIONING OF FORCES BY ITSELF SHOULD NOT WORK AN UNDUE BURDEN FROM A BOP POINT OF VIEW ON THE NATION SUPPLYING THOSE FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY HAVE QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS ARBITRARY REQUIREMENT DOESN'T REFLECT A MISUNDERSTANDING IN THIS COUNTRY, WHICH OUR POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CORRECT, THAT US FORCES ARE IN EUROPE FOR AN AMERICAN SECURITY INTEREST.

Q: I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE VERY ADOPTION OF THIS

AMENDMENT MIGHT CAUSE SOME OF THESE NATIONS TO BECOME SKITTISH AND SAY, AMERICANS IF THEY DON'T SOLVE THEIR BOP DEFICIT PROBLEM, ARE GOING TO PULL OUT REGARDLESS OF ANY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS." DO YOU SEE ANY CONCERN AMONG THESE NATIONS EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE AMERICAN PUB-

LIC DOESN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THEIR OWN TROOPS ARE HERE?

A: STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WHICH INDICATE THAT THERE IS A CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THIS COUNTRY MAY BE CHANGING TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION LIKES IT OR NOT, THERE MAY BE A GROWING FEELING IN THIS COUNTRY THAT WE HAVE MAINTAINED THIS COMMITMENT TOO LONG AND THAT IT IS TIME NOW TO WITHDRAW FORCES.

Q: "SUPPOSE WE ASKED YOU FOR A SPECIFIC POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AS TO WHETHER JACKSON-NUNN, WHETHER THIS COMMITTEE SHOULD RECOMMEND TO THE HOUSE, JACKSON-NUNN BE REPEATED, THAT WE CONTINUE TO FOLLOW CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 042249

JACKSON-NUNN, OR THAT WE ASK FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE TIME FRAME OF JACKSON-NUNN, OR, THAT WE TAKE ANOTHER APPROACH. WHAT WOULD YOUR POSITION BE?

A: "I WOULD PREFER NOT TO GIVE A PERSONAL VIEW ON THAT. I THINK THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE AN ADMINISTRATION VIEW, AND I WILL ENDEAVOR TO SEEK SUCH A STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTIONS."

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION:

Q: HOW MUCH MILITARY PROCUREMENT WOULD BE MADE IN THIS COUNTRY EVEN WITHOUT THE PRESSURE FOR US TO REDUCE THE BOP DEFICIT AS A RESULT OF OUR TROOP LEVELS. MIGHT IT NOT BE THEIR INTEREST TO BUY HERE REGARDLESS?

A: WE ARE NOT LOOKING AT THIS IN TERMS OF WHAT THEY WOULD OR WOULDN'T DO IN AN ORDINARY SITUATION. WE ARE LOOKING AT THE FACTUAL SITUATION. HOW MUCH ARE THEY PURCHASING THAT WE CAN USE TO REDUCE THAT DEFICIT. WE ARE TRYING TO GET ALL THE FIGURES WE CAN, NOT ONLY ABOUT THE GOVT. - TO GOVT. OPERATIONS, BUT ABOUT THE PRIVATE TRADE AS WELL.

Q: WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL DEFICIT WOULD THAT COVER? IT WOULDN'T COVER IT ALL, WOULD IT?

A: AT THE CURRENT STAGE, NO. IT IS GOING TO BE VERY

DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO GET UP TO THE TOP FIGURE. WE ARE CURRENTLY ASKING THEM FOR HARD OFFSET ITEMS, BUT WE ARE NOT RULING OUT BY THE DEFINITIONS OF THE JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT THE USE OF SOFT OFFSET ITEMS, BECAUSE IT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR IN THE AMENDMENT WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE OFFSET.

Q: DOES THE AMENDMENT HANDICAP YOU IN ANY WAY YOU HAVE NOT MENTIONED?

A: WE DID NOT FAVOR THE ADOPTION OF THIS AMENDMENT, BECAUSE WE FELT IT WOULD GIVE THE WRONG IMPRESSION AS TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 042249

WHAT THE BASIS WAS FOR OUR POLICY IN MAINTAINING FORCES IN EUROPE. WHILE THE ALLIES AGREED TO DO THEIR BEST, WE THINK THAT MAKING THE BEST EFFORT IS REALLY THE TEST, AND WE HAVE HAD A GOOD RESPONSE FROM THEM. I AM SURE THAT THEY AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE VERY UNHAPPY IF AN ARBITRARY CONCLUSION WERE REACHED BECAUSE WE HADN'T MET A SMALL PART OF THIS DEFICIT, THAT SO MANY TROOPS HAD TO COME OUT OF EUROPE.

Q: ONE OF THE THINGS THAT INFLUENCED US IN GOING ALONG WITH JACKSON-NUNN IS THAT WE WERE TOLD INFORMALLY THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO OUR PEOPLE IN BRUSSELS, IN ENCOURAGING THE ALLIES TO DO MORE. HAS THAT PROVED TO BE TRUE?

A: YES. THEY UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS FACED BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND ARE DOING THEIR BEST TO HELP MEET THE POLITICAL PRESSURES THEY REALIZE ARE THERE. I SHOULD ALSO SAY WE ARE VERY MINDFUL AND VERY THANKFUL TO MR. STRATTON FOR THE FLEXIBILITY THAT HE WAS ABLE TO GIVE US. OUR LAWYERS HAVE BEEN ARGUING ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THAT 18 MONTHS PERIOD IS REAL IN TERMS OF THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE AMENDMENT. I CERTAINLY WELCOME A STATEMENT FROM HIM AS TO HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE FLEXIBILITY THAT HE GAVE US."

Q: "THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE FACT THAT IT IS REAL. IT IS IN THERE. AND IT MEANS WHAT IT SAYS, WHICH IS, THAT YOU'VE GOT ANOTHER SIX MONTHS (SIX) TO MEET THE ITEM WHICH IS SPELLED OUT IN TERMS OF THE OFFSET-- IN TERMS OF THE DEFICIT FOR FISCAL '74." WE ARE THE ONES THAT AGREED TO THE WORDING, SO I THINK OUR STATEMENTS ARE FINAL TESTIMONY." END EXECUTIVE PORTION.

(B) MBFR:

Q: WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATUS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS?

A: BOTH SIDES HAVE LAID OUT PROPOSALS AND ARE EXCHANGING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THEM. WE ARE IN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES. THEY ARE TAKING THESE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 042249

NEGOTIATIONS SERIOUSLY AND WE HAVE REACHED A COMMON POSITION WHICH TAKES ALLIED CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT.

Q: WHAT ARE US GOALS?

A: WE WANT TO ELIMINATE THE ASYMMETRY IN FORCE LEVELS WHICH EXIST, PARTICULARLY IN GROUND TROOPS AND TANKS. THE DISCREPANCY IN FORCES COULD BE ELIMINATED IN SEVERAL WAYS: A LOWER LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING, OR YOU WOULD JUST HAVE A REDUCTION ON THE PART OF THE OTHER SIDE TO THE LEVEL OF OUR SIDE, OR YOU COULD LOOK MORE AT SOME OF THE QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION. THERE WILL HAVE TO BE MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, THERE WILL NOT BE A UNILATERAL REDUCTION ON THE PART OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. WE HOPE TO FIND A "BALANCE". WE WANT TO ACHIEVE A SITUATION OF STABILITY AND WE MUST CONVINCE THEM THAT THAT HAS ADVANTAGES FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. THE AGREEMENT MUST NOT ENDANGER OUR OWN SECURITY.

Q: WHAT IS THE FUTURE MBFR TIMETABLE?

A: NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE SLOWER THAN IN SALT SINCE THESE ARE NOT ONE-TO-ONE NEGOTIATIONS. WE MUST CONSULT ON EACH DEVELOPMENT WITH OUR ALLIES. WE SEEK EARLY PROGRESS BUT IT WILL BE MODEST. WE HOPE TO MOVE BY STAGES WITH THE FIRST STAGE COVERING US AND USSR FORCES BUT THIS IS NOT THE END OF THE LINE. IN THE MEANTIME WE MUST NOT MAKE UNILATERAL US WITHDRAWALS.

(C) CSCE:

Q: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE CSCE?

A: WE HOPE TO IMPROVE THE INTERCHANGE BETWEEN SOCIETIES IN MANY WAYS. BROAD DECLARATIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH, WE HOPE FOR PRACTICAL RESULTS. ON THE BASIS OF AGREEMENTS THAT WERE MADE INITIALLY IN HELSINKI WE ARE NOW MEETING IN GENEVA TO TALK ABOUT HOW SOME OF THOSE GENERAL AGREEMENTS CAN BE TURNED INTO A POSSIBLE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST, AND PERHAPS THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOME PRACTICAL MEASURES THAT WILL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 042249

MOVE TOWARD THE EASING OF TENSIONS AND THE GREATER INTER-CHANGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. WE CERTAINLY HOPE FOR IMPROVED TRADE TIES, BECAUSE WE FEEL THAT THROUGH IMPROVEMENT OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WE ENCOURAGE AN INTERCHANGE BETWEEN OUR SOCIETIES WHICH WILL LEAD TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES OF HOW OUR SYSTEMS WORK. IT WILL HELP TO AT LEAST REDUCE TENSIONS THAT FLOW FROM A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND A LACK OF COMMUNICATION. THAT IS WHY WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN SEEING THE TRADE BILL PASSED WITHOUT THE RESTRICTIONS THAT IT NOW CONTAINS ON THE

EXTENSION OF MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT AND CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EASTERN BLOC.

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS?

A: WE EXPECT THAT THOSE TALKS WILL GO ON. THERE ARE MANY DIFFICULT ISSUES THAT ARE BETWEEN THE EASTERN PARTIES TO THAT CONFERENCE AND SOME OF THE NATIONS IN THE WEST. THE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ISSUES ARE ON THE QUESTION OF HUMAN CONTACTS AND INTERCHANGE.

Q: WHAT ARE FUTURE PROSPECTS?

A: WE HAVE ALWAYS HAD A RATHER MODEST VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF THIS CONFERENCE, BUT WE BELIEVE IT CAN HAVE SOME UTILITY. AND WE ARE CERTAINLY PURSUING IT AGAIN IN VERY CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, AND ALSO, I THINK IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE, WITH THE NEUTRAL COUNTRIES OF EUROPE WHO ARE ALSO PARTICIPATING IN THAT CONFERENCE, AND THEY ARE VERY ACTIVE IN IT.

Q: ARE MILITARY MATTERS INVOLVED IN CSCE?

A: CERTAIN PRINCIPLES INVOLVE THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS; TALKS COVER WAYS OF REDUCING POSSIBILITY OF MISCALCULATION BY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS, SO THAT TROOP ACTIVITIES ON EITHER SIDE WILL NOT BE MISCONSTRUED AS A THREAT. THEY ARE GROUPED UNDER A CATEGORY CALLED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 042249

"CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES." WE WILL ALSO DISCUSS THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS.

(D) THE FUTURE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE:

Q: IN VIEW OF THE DISUNITY SHOWN DURING THE MIDDLE EAST WAR?

A: AT THE TIME OF HOSTILITIES EVENTS MOVED TOO FAST FOR US TO CONVEY OUR PERCEPTION OF PROBLEM AND THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEWED IT. EUROPE HAD DIFFERENT VIEWS AND APPROACHES TO THE MIDDLE EAST WAR. EUROPEANS FELT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE NATO ALLIANCE AND THEREFORE THAT THEY COULD TAKE A POSITION THAT WAS NOT A COMMON ONE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THESE DIFFERENCES STILL EXIST TODAY. WE ARE TRYING TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS, SO THAT WHEN WE DO HAVE DIFFERENCES WE CAN BRING OUR VIEWS CLOSER TOGETHER IN

ORDER TO REACH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE VARYING POSITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN. THE ALLIES SUPPORT THE SECRETARY'S EFFORTS IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THERE IS A COMMON VIEW THAT CONFLICT IN THE AREA MUST BE STOPPED.

Q: IN VIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENTS AT THE ENERGY CONFERENCE?

A: THE CONFERENCE REVEALED THAT THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF ALL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES THAT A COMMON APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM MUST BE FOUND. WE ARE SETTING UP A GROUP TO STUDY THE PROBLEM. WE WANT TO ELIMINATE THE UNLIMITED COMPETITION WHICH MIGHT SUPPORT HIGHER OIL PRICES. THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE WAS THAT "GOING YOUR OWN WAY" IS THE WRONG WAY TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM.

(E) THE DECLARATIONS OF PRINCIPLES WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE NATO ALLIES:

Q: WHAT WOULD THE EFFECT OF THE DECLARATIONS BE OTHER THAN THE BROAD GENERAL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES?
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 042249

A: WE ARE TRYING TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN DEVELOP BROAD CONCEPTS WHICH WOULD HELP TO PORTRAY PUBLICLY THE KIND OF RE-COMMITMENT WE ARE MAKING TO WORKING TOGETHER. WE WANT TO DESCRIBE OUR TIES WITH OUR ALLIES IN DETAIL AND OUR DETERMINATION TO WORK TOGETHER.

(F). DEPENDENTS IN EUROPE:

Q: SHOULD MILITARY DEPENDENTS BE IN EUROPE?

A: WE ACCEPT THE MILITARY JUDGEMENT THAT THIS PROVIDES
FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE FORCE.

2. FYI: MISSION SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THESE QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS ARE FROM THE UNCORRECTED, UNPUBLISHED
TRANSCRIPT OF SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS. THEY ARE FOR
BACKGROUND USE ONLY AND MAY NOT BE PLACED IN THE PUBLIC
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